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PRE-APPEAL BRIEF REQUEST FOR REVIEW

Docket Number (Optional)

32161US2

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Application Number

10/733,981

Filed

12/11/2003

First Named Inventor

Toshihiko Munetsugu

Art Unit

2176

Examiner

Maikhanh Nguyen

Applicant requests review of the final rejection in the above-identified application. No amendments are being filed with this request.

This request is being filed with a notice of appeal.

The review is requested for the reason(s) stated on the attached sheet(s).

Note: No more than five (5) pages may be provided.

I am the

☐ applicant/inventor.

☐ assignee of record of the entire interest.
See 37 CFR 3.71. Statement under 37 CFR 3.73(b) is enclosed.
(Form PTO/SB/96)

☒ attorney or agent of record. 48540
Registration number _____

☐ attorney or agent acting under 37 CFR 1.34.

Registration number if acting under 37 CFR 1.34 _____

/ Robert F. Bodi /

Signature

Robert F. Bodi

Typed or printed name

216/579-1700

Telephone number

June 19, 2007

Date

NOTE: Signatures of all the inventors or assignees of record of the entire interest or their representative(s) are required. Submit multiple forms if more than one signature is required, see below*.

☒ *Total of 1 forms are submitted.

This collection of information is required by 35 U.S.C. 132. The information is required to obtain or retain a benefit by the public which is to file (and by the USPTO to process) an application. Confidentiality is governed by 35 U.S.C. 122 and 37 CFR 1.11, 1.14 and 41.6. This collection is estimated to take 12 minutes to complete, including gathering, preparing, and submitting the completed application form to the USPTO. Time will vary depending upon the individual case. Any comments on the amount of time you require to complete this form and/or suggestions for reducing this burden, should be sent to the Chief Information Officer, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. Department of Commerce, P.O. Box 1450, Alexandria, VA 22313-1450. DO NOT SEND FEES OR COMPLETED FORMS TO THIS ADDRESS. SEND TO: Mail Stop AF, Commissioner for Patents, P.O. Box 1450, Alexandria, VA 22313-1450.

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IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

Applicant : Toshihiko Munetsugu
Appln. No. : 10/733,981
Filed : December 11, 2003
Title : DATA PROCESSING DEVICE AND METHOD FOR SELECTING
MEDIA SEGMENTS ON THE BASIS OF A SCORE

Conf. No. : 1257
TC/A.U. : 2176
Examiner : Maikhanh Nguyen

Customer No. : 000,116
Docket No. : 32161US2

PreAppeal Brief Review Arguments/Remarks

Claims 37-63 remain in this application. Claims 1-36 have been previously canceled. The examiner has acknowledged that claims 60-63 are directed to allowable subject matter. Applicant notes that the Notice of Appeal, and these remarks, are filed with an amendment that corrects an error in the claims that was introduced early in the prosecution of this case, namely the term “content description data” has been amended to read “context description data” as that term is used in the specification. Applicant’s representative notes that the prior filed arguments relating to “content description data” apply to the term “context description data.”

In the Office action of December 19, 2006, claims 37, 39-45, 47, 49-54, and 55 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Smith *et al.* (Video Skimming and Characterization through the Combination of Image and Language Understanding Techniques). Claims 38, 46, 48, and 56-59 were rejected as above in further view of B. Arons (SpeechSkimmer).

Applicant would first like to point out that it is clear that the Examiner is confusing the claimed “***context description data***” with media content (such as the video of Smith or the audio of Arons), and that her arguments all apply to the media content itself, not to any context description data that the claims clearly define as being different than media content and which the references do not in any way teach or suggest. Thus, the Examiner’s arguments do not apply

to the claims. The Examiner has not pointed to any teaching that is in any way similar to the context description data of the invention.

For example, claim 37 recites a data processing apparatus including an “input unit operable to input *context description data* including a plurality of segments each for *describing* one of said plurality of scenes of *media content*”. Claim 57 recites a data processing apparatus including “input means for inputting context description data *describing* said plurality of scenes”. As discussed in detail in the response and at the previously conducted personal interview, the prior art does not teach any such context description data or any apparatus for inputting such context description data.

The Smith reference is directed toward a research project where many of the steps are done manually, perhaps using various support machines such as computers and/or various video equipment. However, Smith does not teach any context description data, and Smith fails to teach any specific data processing *apparatus* for inputting *context description data*, as those are defined by the claims. A teaching of an apparatus that might, or might not (the reference is does not discuss this matter) input media content is not relevant. As pointed out to the examiners at the personal interview, Smith is basically a *research* paper that discusses a supposedly new *method* of skimming video while preserving the important information found in the video (see abstract), so that a viewer can view time-compressed video but still capture the most important aspects of that video. See, e.g., the Abstract. Smith describes an *algorithm* to create skim videos (id. See also the Conclusion). However, all Smith discusses is the video itself, as it is silent to any data for describing the video. Thus, Smith does not teach any data processing *apparatus* for inputting *context description data*. In fact, Smith makes clear that his method relies on *manual* processes (stating that the “*manually* created skims in the initial stages of the experiment help test the potential visual clarity and comprehension of the skims” --see section 3.5, first sentence). There is no teaching of any “input unit operable to input *context description data*” as required by the claims.

In the Advisory Action of March 26, 2007, the Examiner responds to these arguments by stating that Smith teaches “browsing” and “displaying”, and thus there must be an apparatus. But that argument merely supports the existence of a display for performing those functions. Such a display could be, for example, a DVD player with a monitor. The teaching does not imply that there is any apparatus for inputting *context description data* that is for *describing*

media content. Throughout the Examiner's arguments, she has consistently confused "context description data" with the actual media content data (e.g., video and/or audio). The claims make clear that the "context description data" includes a plurality of "segments" each "for describing one of a plurality of scenes of media content" which includes a "context attribute" having a "value for describing a context of said media content" and a "plurality of importance attributes each...having a value representing a degree of contextual importance of [a] corresponding one of said segments". Thus, the context description data is for *describing* the media content, it is not the media content itself. Any reading of the specification would make this clear.

Thus, although the Examiner appears to be arguing that the ability to input *media content* is inherent to the Smith teachings (a point that is *not* conceded by applicants), such arguments are not relevant to the claim language, which specifically recites inputting *context description data*, not *media content*, and thus the Examiner's arguments cannot be applied to the claims.

Accordingly, the Examiner's arguments of the teachings of Smith regarding inputting of media content are not persuasive, as the Examiner has failed to show any teaching of inputting, into any apparatus, data that is for the purpose of *describing* media content as recited in the claims.

Furthermore, claims 37, 57, and 47 all recite inputting of context description data that includes a "context attribute" having a "*value* for describing a context of said media content". As also discussed at the personal interview, the cited prior art fails to teach any such "context attribute" having a "*value*". There is no teaching in Smith or Arons of any attribute having a *value* that is for describing a *context* of the media content is input into any apparatus.

In the Advisory Action, the Examiner argues that Smith "must assign values when prioritizing to indicate high/low level[s] of priority". However, even if this is the case (and applicant does *not* concede this point), there is no teaching that such values are "input" into any apparatus as a part of any context description data. Instead, they could be determined by some apparatus itself, or manually determined by the researchers.

Furthermore, there is no need to assign a "value" to determine a high or low priority, and Smith fails to explicitly teach any such value. For example, Smith could merely make a list of all high-priority portions of video, and thus assume that any not-listed portions are low priority. Thus, it is not at all inherent that Smith must utilize priority "values", and thus the Examiner's

argument fails on this point as well, as Smith does not imply any values by its prioritization scheme.

At most, Smith teaches using the media content itself for the skimming (i.e., basically condensing the data into a smaller amount for quick viewing). There is no teaching of any *context description data* that *describes* media content as being *input* into any *apparatus*. In addition, note that the segments outputted by the output unit of the claims are also part of the *context description data*, whereas all Smith appears to teach is providing skimmed **video** based on an analysis of the video itself. Again, there is nothing at all comparable to the context description data suggested by the reference and there is no teaching of any **values** being associated with the video.

Thus, as is shown by the above arguments, the Examiner is consistently confusing the *media content* of the cited prior art references with the very differently defined *context description data* of the claims, and thus her arguments cannot withstand scrutiny, and the claims are patentable over Smith.

Aron does not overcome any of the Smith shortcomings. Aron is directed to audio skimming, and thus is not applicable to a video apparatus. It does not disclose any context description data that describes media content comprised of a plurality of scenes, because no such content is discussed. The reference does not disclose any input unit for inputting context description data as recited in the claims. Thus, the claims are patentable over the combination of references as well.

Finally, the Examiner has rejected the claims for obviousness-type double patenting in light of patent number 7,134,074 (serial number 09/785,063) and application serial number 09/467,231. However, the Examiner has not provided a proper rejection for obviousness-type double patenting in light of the '231 application. MPEP §804(II)(B)(1), second paragraph, as argued in the prior filed response. The Examiner is required to make the following factual inquiries required by MPEP §804(II)(B)(1), paragraphs 3-7:

- (A) Determine the scope and content of a patent claim and the prior art relative to a claim in the application at issue;
- (B) Determine the differences between the scope and content of the patent claim and the prior art as determined in (A) and the claim in the application at issue;
- (C) Determine the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and
- (D) Evaluate any objective indicia of nonobviousness.

The conclusion of obviousness-type double patenting is made in light of these factual determinations.

The rejection is also required to make clear the following (MPEP §804(II)(B)(1) 8th paragraph):

- (A) The differences between the inventions defined by the conflicting claims — a claim in the patent compared to a claim in the application; and
- (B) The reasons why a person of ordinary skill in the art would conclude that the invention defined in the claim in issue is an obvious variation of the invention defined in a claim in the patent.

It was pointed out that the Examiner has failed to make the proper factual inquiries and has failed to show the differences between the inventions defined by the conflicting claims or identify any reasons why one skilled in the art would find such differences to be obvious. In fact, the Examiner has cited no art as teaching the various elements that she has indicated are “obvious” in the action of December 19, 2007, and thus she has provided no facts at all to support her rejections for double patenting. Instead, the Examiner has merely made a blanket conclusory statement that the differences between the claims would be “obvious” to one of ordinary skill. But such a conclusory statement, without providing evidence that such differences between the claims were known in the art, does not meet the requirements of the MPEP. The Examiner must show that the differences between the claims were actually known in the art, and she must show the proper motivation for adding them. Accordingly, the Examiner has not made a proper rejection for Obviousness-type double patenting. Consequently, although the Applicant asserts that the claims in the application are not obvious in light of the reference, applicant cannot respond to the rejections because applicant is not cognizant of what is considered, by the Examiner, as the obvious elements. Therefore, the Examiner must either withdraw the rejections, or provide the required factual inquiries and analysis in support of the rejection.

Respectfully submitted,
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June 19, 2007

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